

Message Text

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PAGE 01 COPENH 00662 031715 Z

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ACTION EA-14

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TRSE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 EB-11 /147 W

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FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6758

INFO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L COPENHAGEN 0662

E. O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR DA XZ KN VS KS

SUBJECT: NORDIC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

REF: STATE 51555, 52999

SUMMARY: EMBOFF DISCUSSED MARCH 29-30 MEETING IN OSLO OF NORDIC FOREIGN MINISTERS WITH THORNING PETERSEN, WHO WAS MEMBER OF DANISH DELEGATION AND PART OF COMMUNIQUE DRAFTING GROUP. PETERSEN RELATED THAT ON SEVERAL POINTS, INCLUDING KOREA AND VIETNAM, DANES HAD SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE MORE FAVORABLE TO U. S. POINTS OF VIEW THAN THAT SPONSORED BY SWEDEN. HE ANTICIPATES FINNS AND SWEDES WILL RECOGNIZE NORTH KOREA VERY SOON, WITH DANES AND POSSIBLY ICELAND FOLLOWING SUIT IN MAY, AND NORWAY STILL LATER. END SUMMARY.

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PAGE 02 COPENH 00662 031715 Z

1. ON VIETNAM, COMMUNIQUE TALKS ABOUT " SPEEDY SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH SITUATION OF CIVILIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS", WITHOUT SPECIFYING LOCUS OF PROBLEMS. AS SOUTH VIETNAM' S TREATMENT OF ITS POLITICAL PRISONERS HAS BEEN TARGET OF WIDE CRITICISM IN DENMARK, AS WELL AS SWEDEN, THIS BLAND FORMULATION IS VERY RESTRAINED. LOCAL GRV INFORMATION OFFICE, PETERSEN POINTED OUT, HAS MADE PROBLEM AVAILABLE TO WORK OUT MORE COMPLETE AGREEMENT IS ESSENTIALLY SHORT, EVEN IF EXPRESSED IN MAXIMUM TERMS.

3. SEMENOV DISCUSSED PROBLEMS TO BE RESOLVED IN UNDERSTANDING (DOGOVORYENOST') ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS:

A) UNDERSTANDING SHOULD PROVIDE ESTABLISHMENT OF LEVELS FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. SOVIET SIDE UNDERSTANDS US SIDE AGREES.

B) UNDERSTANDING SHOULD PROVIDE ESTABLISHMENT OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON LAND- BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND SUBMARINES. ALLEGATIONS THAT SOVIET SIDE LEAVES ASIDE THESE WEAPONS ARE GROUNDLESS, SINCE IT HAS REPEATEDLY STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF LIMITS ON THEM. SUCH LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED ON BASIS OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS. IN REACHING THESE AGREEMENTS, SIDES CONSIDERED AND AGREED ON QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE AND TOOK INTO ACCOUNT ASYMMETRIES AND OTHER MATTERS OF A POLITICAL AND MILITARY- TECHNICAL CHARACTER.

C) UNDERSTANDING SHOULD PROVIDE ESTABLISHMENT OF AGREED LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC AVIATION AND ITS ARMAMENTS. SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM PREMISE SUCH LIMITATIONS ARE AS IMPORTANT FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY AS THOSE ON ICBMS AND SLBMS.

D) UNDERSTANDING SHOULD PROVIDE SOLUTION OF QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS AND LIQUIDATION OF CORRESPONDING BASES IN THRID COUNTRIES. SOVIET SIDE HAS PRESENTED CONCRETE PROPOSALS IN THIS REGARD.

E) UNDERSTANDING SHOULD PROVIDE SOLUTION TO QUESTION OF QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. IN COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS, ATTENTION
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PAGE 03 SALT T 00137 032100 Z

HAS REPEATEDLY BEEN DRAWN TO FACT THAT COMPETITION IN AREA OF QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS CAN PRESENT VERY SERIOUS DANGER IN TERMS OF POSSIBILITY OF UPSETTING STRATEGIC STABILITY. SEMENOV SAID NO SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS ALONG THESE LINES HAD YET BEEN HEARD FROM US SIDE. CONSIDERATIONS OF US SIDE ON THIS QUESTION WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO FULLER UNDERSTANDING OF US APPROACH.

F) UNDERSTANDING SHOULD INCLUDE PROVISION THAT MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT AND ALSO RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE PERMITTED SUBJECT TO AGREED LIMITATIONS. DISCUSSION OF QUESTION AT PREVIOUS PHASE SHOWED SIDES' VIEWS WERE SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE, ALTHOUGH ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS CONCERNING STRATEGIC AVIATION AND ITS ARMAMENTS, THERE REMAIN WELL- KNOWN DIFFERENCES.

G) SEMENOV SAID HE WISHED TO CLARIFY THAT LIMITS IN POSSIBLE AGREEMENT SHOULD APPLY TO STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH ARE OPERATIONAL; UNDERGOING REPAIR, OVERHAUL OR CONVERSION; OR PLACED IN RESERVE OR MOTHBALLED.

H) CONCERNING LAUNCHERS FOR ICBMS AND SLBMS AND OTHER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH ARE FOR TESTING AND TRAINING, THEIR NUMBER WOULD BE LIMITED TO AGREED LEVELS.

4. JOHNSON RESPONDED TO SOVIET STATEMENT OF MARCH 30. ADDRESSING CONCEPT OF RESTRAINT, HE SAID US HAS HAD CONTINUING POLICY OF RESTRAINT IN DEFENSE FIELD. SOVIET PROPOSAL HAS BEEN PRESENTED IN VERY GENERAL TERMS, BUT RESTRAINT IS EVIDENTLY TO BE APPLIED TO PROGRAMS AND WEAPONS ON BASIS THEY ARE " NEW" RATHER THAN UPON CONSIDERATION OF MORE APPROPRIATE FACTORS. HE NOTED PREVIOUS SOVIET PROPOSALS HAVE IDENTIFIED FOR RESTRAINT MAJOR PROGRAMS, BUT NOT SOVIET PROGRAMS. US BELIEVES IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO CONSIDER OBLIGATIONS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT WITH REGARD TO CERTAIN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS BEFORE WE HAVE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON CENTRAL SYSTEMS.

5. JOHNSON REBUTTED CRITICISM IN SOVIET MARCH 30 STATEMENT OF US STRESS ON SURVIVABILITY AND PENETRATION CAPABILITY OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS. HE SAID CONFIDENCE IN
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PAGE 04 SALT T 00137 032100 Z

ENDURING SURVIVABILITY OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND THEIR ABILITY TO PENETRATE DEFENSES IS AN ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF DETERRENCE AND STABLE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AND THUS CONTRIBUTES TO EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS.

HE ALSO REITERATED US POSITION LINKING CONSIDERATION OF
LIMITS ON BOMBER ARMAMENTS WITH LIMITS ON AIR DEFENSES AND
REAFFIRMED US PROPOSAL ON ICBM THROW WEIGHT.

6. JOHNSON CONCLUDED WITH REVIEW OF APPARENT SOVIET POSITION ON CEN-
TRAL SYSTEMS IN PERMANENT AGREEMENT. SOVIETS WOULD HAVE ABOUT 1400
ICBM LAUNCHERS, INCLUDING OVER 300 FOR HEAVY ICBMS, TO
ABOUT 1000 FOR US PLUS ABOUT 1000 SLBM LAUNCHERS TO
ABOUT 700 FOR US. IN ADDITION, ALL HEAVY BOMBERS WOULD BE
REMOVED FROM STRATEGIC EQUATION. JOHNSON FOUND THIS PRO-
POSAL SO ONE- SIDED AS TO QUESTION HOW IT COULD PO
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